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and the Ethical Ideal of Informed and 
Shared Decision-making 
The High Court's judgment in Rogers ν Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 
has belatedly recognised as persuasive the values and attitudes of IAN H KERRIDGE 
particular patients in what constitutes for them a significant treatment BA Med (Hons), M Phil 
risk. The importance now attached to these subjective patient factors Clinical Lecturer, Health Law and 
was shown in the High Court's determination that physicians now J*ics Pr°zrammf> F°c»lty °f 
. . ,. , , , » . , -y Medicine, University of Newcastle have a duty to disclose and warn regarding material risks specific to 
the particular patient. It is our belief that the Rogers ν Whitaker a n d 
emphasis on the requirements for disclosure underscores much of the KENNETH R MITCHELL 
misinterpretation of consent as a single event or action rather than as
 M S c M E D p h D F A P s S 
an ever-present sequela of a process which informs decision-making.
 Senior *Lecture\t Heal¡n Law and 
What is required is a shift in focus from disclosure to understanding Ethics Programme, Faculty of 
and from unilateral information-transfer to the integrated process of Medicine, University of Newcastle 
shared and informed decision-making. 
Over the years, Australian courts have slowly shaped the 
requirements for informed consent. Far from being planned and 
carefully argued changes to medical practice which reflect evolving 
ethical insights and societal expectations regarding self-determination, 
they have instead occurred as a result of retrospective legal reviews of 
doctor-patient conflicts. Since the "landmark" decision of the High 
Court in the most recent legal conflict, Rogers ν Whitaker,1 
delivered in November 1992, lawyers have rushed into print numerous 
commentaries which sought to explain its implications for medical 
practice,2 and to reassure practitioners that "no new, unreasonable 
burden had been placed upon them".3 ι /1992\ 1 7 5 C L R 479. 
2
 I Dunn, "What Should Your 
The High Court's judgment, while adding to the mountain of words Doctor Tell You?" (1993) Law 
written about "informed consent", what it means and how it might institute Journal 268; R C Pincus, 
be achieved, represents yet another instance of a court decision falling
 A r r ^ e d ^n°Tustralia?'
l,Se(l993)nt59 
short of the law's professed commitment to the value of patient Medical Journal of Australia 25. 
autonomy or self-determination on the one hand, and to the ethical 3 L Skene and R Smallwood, 
ideal of shared decision-making regarding treatment on the other. On ^^r^m¡^JoJSi 
the positive side, current law encourages health care workers to
 0f Australia 367. 
disclose important facts to patients and to seek their consent before 4 President's Commission For the 
treatment occurs. Our scepticism relates to the unlikelihood that ^¡™ΕΓ%ΓίΕΆ 
expansions of the existing law, based as it usually is on retrospective Research, "informed Consent as 
conflicts, could ever provide an ethically ideal framework which Active, Shared Decision-making" in 
would ensure either respect for patient autonomy or a constructive *iaking ^ h Care Decisions 
u i u x
 At_ · 1 , <* , . 1 1 (Government Printing Office, balance between the rights and values of the patient and the Washington, DC, 1982), Vol 1, ρ 390 
Obligations Owed by practitioners to the principle of beneficence.4 (hereafter President's Commission). 
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We intend to argue that the current legal requirements for informed κ E R R ι D G E and 
consent (following Rogers ν Whitaker) reflect essentially superficial M I T C H E L L 
changes that not only fall short of the ethical ideal of shared and 
informed decision-making but also serve to reinforce existing 
problems in the doctor-patient relationship. We preface our argument 
by a brief look at the history of informed consent before contrasting 
the post-Rogers ν Whitaker requirements with both the patient-
autonomy perspective and the more ethically desirable perspective of 
shared and informed decision-making. 
Informed consent: Historical origins 
The term "informed consent" first arose in North America in 
19575 and served to shift practitioner emphasis away from medical 
paternalism towards a "duty" to respect the autonomy of patients. 
Unlike previous opinions about consent to medical treatment, the 
Salgo court focused on the problem of whether or not the consent had 
been informed when given. The court created an "informed consent 
standard" and, contrary to previous practice, the nature, 
consequences, harm and benefits, risks and alternatives of a treatment 
on offer were now held to be the information needed by an ordinary 
patient to make a "reasonable" decision regarding its acceptance or 
rejection. 
The Salgo decision did not appear to influence materially the 
English and Australian courts which favoured the more conservative 
"Bolam test"6 as enunciated in the 1985 Sidaway case.7 The Bolam 
decision affirmed the duty of care owed by a doctor to a patient to 
inform them of the risks involved in any proposed procedure or 
treatment. This duty of care, it was determined, was to be discharged 
in accordance with the practice accepted at the time as proper by a 
responsible body of medical opinion and came to be known as the 
"Professional Practice Standard of Disclosure". However, in 
Sidaway, it was held that "currently accepted practice" would not 
override or excuse the non-disclosure of a particular risk of serious 
adverse consequences to the patient, where it is obvious to the prudent 
doctor that such disclosure would be necessary if the patient were to 
make a rational or informed choice as to whether to accept or reject 
the treatment offered. Failure to do so, it was opined, may provide 
grounds for negligence. The subsequent dimensions of the 
requirement for informed consent for everyday procedures continued 
to be slowly shaped in England and Australia by case law.8 
5
 Salgo ν Leland Stanford Jr 
. University Board of Trustees 317 P 2d 
Rogers ν Whitaker: Current legal requirements no (1957) (Cai Dist Ct App). 
6
 Bolam ν Friern Hospital 
During the 1980s, ethical and legal argument concerning the Management Committee [1957] 
meaning of "informed consent" continued unabated. Ethically, the 1 T^lyVßoard of Governors of 
struggle was to reconceptuahse the decision-making process and to Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 
determine how the competing moral imperatives of respect for patient AC 871 at 893. 
autonomy and beneficence could be balanced and ethically justified. 8 F ν The Queen (1983) 33 SASR 
Legally, the focus has primarily been to clarify the requirements for Jg ^ " JJ£M\SSÍ A U A ' S Í 
grievance in trespass or negligence on the part of the patient. These ¿ " ^
 80°259"(Supreme Court) and 
requirements, particularly the extent to which information regarding (1989) Aust Torts Reports 80-289 
harms and risks should be disclosed to a patient, were examined and (Court of Appeal). 
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further clarified by the High Court of Australia when it handed down Missing the Point: Rogers ν 
its judgment in the Rogers ν Whitaker appeal.9 The Court's Whitaker and the Ethical ideal of 
judgment rejected use of the expression "informed consent" as "apt informed * n ^ ^ d 
to mislead", introduced the term "duty of disclosure", and easion-ma mg 
reaffirmed that doctors have a duty to disclose and warn patients of 
"material risk".10 Furthermore, the basic duty to disclose was 
deemed to be present even when the patient does not seek information 
through specific questions. This was emphasised by Gaudron J when 
she wrote: "where, for example, no specific inquiry is made, the 
[doctors'] duty is to provide the information that would reasonably be 
required by a person in the position of the patient."11 Gaudron J 
also pointed out that the duty to disclose or to warn of all material 
risks was a minimum, not a maximum. She added: "A patient may 
have special needs or concerns which, if known to the doctor, will 
indicate that special or additional information is required. In a case 
of that kind, the information to be provided will depend on the 
individual patient concerned."12 Thus, disclosure of information to 
the patient must now take account of factors associated with the 
specific needs of the patient, be they wishes, anxieties or beliefs. While 
the judgment of the High Court has clarified the minimum legal 
requirements, it is fair to say that, in so doing, the law is only 
beginning to catch up with current ethical thinking and practice.13 
The advantages of the High Court's judgment in Rogers ν Whitaker 
are several. In general, it will encourage fuller disclosure of 
information by the doctor. In particular, the doctor is now obliged to 
be "reasonably aware" of what a specific patient will regard as a 
significant risk and there will be added pressure to determine special 
needs for information without which the patient could not make an 
informed decision. Finally, retrospective statements by the patient 
regarding failure by the doctor to warn of some treatment-related risk, 
that would have been perceived by the patient as significant, and 
which if known, would have led them to refuse treatment, will now 
be received in evidence and, if persuasive, accepted.14 The High 
Court judgment, while moving to give further protection to patients 
and their interests, did not, however, address the growing complexity 
of medical procedures which require increasingly difficult decisions by 
health carers on a daily basis. The High Court's judgment may have 
tidied up "institutional consent" by ensuring adequate disclosure 
prior to patient consent, but it neither described nor defined the 
characteristics of autonomous decision-making.15 
9
 (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
1 0
 R Ottley, "Duty to Warn" 
Autonomous decision-making <1993) 7 Australasian Journal of the 
Medical Defence Union 43. 
1 1
 (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 493. 
There is no doubt that current understanding of, and requirements 12 Ibid. 
for, informed consent owe much to the legal system. Unfortunately, 13 τ L Beauchamp and J F 
both the law and institutional guidelines for informed consent 2 ? ^ · /™«f ie5 °{ ^ o m e d ¿ c a l 
„ , , . .
 Γ
 °. ,. . ,
 A Ethics (Oxford University Press, New 
generally place emphasis on information disclosure, and on consent as
 Y o r k > 1 9 8 9 ) 
an action, an autonomous authorisation, rather than as a process. u pincus, op cit η 2. 
Although the Rogers ν Whitaker decision goes some way towards 15 Beauchamp and Childress, op cit 
redressing this misinterpretation, as a legal decision which sets out n 1 3 ; J Katz» "Disclosure and 
legal standards for doctors in clinical practice, it is neither particularly ? S S ^ ^ 
enlightening nor clinically useful. Although adequate disclosure of Genetics and the Law n (Plenum 
risk (which is the central focus of Rogers ν Whitaker) is essential for Press, New York, 1980), ρ 122. 
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informed decision-making, it does not adequately define or describe κ E R R ι D G E and 
it. It is well recognised in legal, philosophical, medical and MITCHELL 
psychological literature that there is a number of components to 
informed consent, including competence, disclosure, understanding, 
voluntariness and consent.16 
Unfortunately this focus of both legal and institutional medical 
standards on disclosure has led to considerable misunderstanding of 
consent in the clinical context. Consent is all too commonly regarded 
as an action (of "consenting a patient"), as synonymous with liability-
oriented information disclosure, and as best represented by 
institutional consent forms. Such an interpretation often leads to a 
perfunctory approach to consent in the clinical context and reinforces 
an unsatisfactory, simplistic and unilateral model of information 
transfer, of physicians talking " a t " rather than "with" patients.17 
What is required is a recognition that consent is not so much an 
action as a process of shared and informed decision-making, that is, 
an ongoing and integral part of the therapeutic relationship. In thisr 
sense, what is at issue is not so much legal liability or the adequacy 
and appropriateness of disclosure as the degree of understanding, the 
quality of the clinical interaction and the process by which decision­
making is informed. It is clear that, in providing information, the 
doctor is not simply meeting legal requirements or institutional 
standards, or providing value-neutral data, but is participating in a 
shared dialogue that should be responsive to the needs, wishes, 
capacities and expressed concerns of that particular patient. Where 
the process of consent embodies shared decision-making, effective 
communication and optimal interactional skills, it not only satisfies 
the legal requirements regarding subjective factors but also optimises 
informed decision-making. The importance of this cannot be 
overstated as the clinical relationship between patients and health care 
professionals involves a continuous flow of decisions focused on the 
present and future health of the patient. Any set of requirements that 
makes disclosure the key item or chief precondition for informed 
consent, incorporates dubious assumptions about medical authority, 
about physician responsibility, and about legal theories of liability, all 
of which delineate an obligation to make disclosures rather than a 
meaning of informed consent.18 
Shared decision-making: The ideal ethical model for clinical 
practice 1 6 Beauchamp amd Childress, op 
cit η 13; Katz, op cit η 15; C W Lidz, 
R S Appelbaum and A Meisel, "Two 
The High Court in Rogers ν Whitaker missed the opportunity to Models of implementing informed 
guide practitioners towards what is both ethically ideal and needed: Consent" (1989) 148 Archives of 
Internal Medicine 1385; G J Riley and 
"a new and unaccustomed dialogue between physicians and their R L Simmonds, *'informed Consent 
patients . . . in which both, appreciative of their respective "Modern Medical Practice "(1992) 
Γ . . . . . ¿ί*
 x
 Λ ι r *u · 152 Medical Journal ofAustralia 336. 
inequalities, make a genuine effort to voice and clarify their
 17 P r e s i d e n t > s commission, op cit 
uncertainties and then to arrive at a mutually satisfying course of
 n
 4. 
a c t i o n . " 1 9 1 8 Katz, op cit η 15; Lidz et al, op 
Rather than imposing the legal doctrine of informed consent in the f£16; R i l e y a n d s i m m o n d s ' 0P c i t 
clinical context, consent is best reconceptualised as a process of shared » president's Commission, op cit 
and informed decision-making. η 4. 
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The central focus of shared decision-making is that the autonomy Missing the Point: Rogers ν 
and interests of the patient should guide clinical management. It is Whitaker and the Ethical ideal of 
preferable to using consent, or the disclosure of information, as the informed and Shared 
central focus of the clinical relationship, because it avoids a simplistic ecision- g 
physician-patient division of labour and the separation between 
"facts" and information on the one hand (doctor's role), and 
preferences, choices or beliefs on the other (patient's role).20 The 
concept of shared and informed decision-making recognises that 
physicians are not simply value-neutral providers of facts regarding 
diagnosis, prognosis and treatment alternatives but are independent 
moral agents with well-defined professional roles. When physicians 
talk with patients, present information to them, give advice or 
encourage compliance, they are expressing, explicitly and implicitly, 
their own values and beliefs in relation to health, disease and their role 
as an advocate for the patients' health.21 Thus, the physician cannot 
be entirely ethically neutral about the values implicit in choices made 
by patients regarding treatment, even when the patient is clearly 
competent. 
Physician as advocate 
We believe physicians are correct in seeing themselves as advocates 
for their patients' health. Of necessity, physicians in their role as 
medical professionals are committed to preserving, promoting and 
restoring health and preventing and treating disease. This advocacy, 
however, must be seen as limited by respect for the self-determination 
of competent patients. It is this interest of patients in making 
important decisions about their own lives that requires physicians to 
respect and not to interfere with patients' treatment choices, even if 
those choices will be bad for them. If a patient's decision-making 
capacities are sufficiently defective to warrant a determination that he 
or she is incompetent to decide for himself or herself, a surrogate must 
make the decisions. The two values of patient well-being and 
self-determination together require a balancing of the physician's role 
between value-committed advocacy for the patient's health and a 
willingness to accept a choice that fails optimally to secure the 
patient's health. Shared decision-making does not imply a 
value-neutral role for physicians; it requires of them a more delicate 
balancing. They must act as advocate for their patients' health and 
well-being, while also being prepared ultimately to respect patients' 
self-determination, even when they disagree with their patients' 
treatment choices.22 This altruistic commitment of physicians to their 
patients' interests, and the setting aside of the interests of all others, 
including their own, is the most striking characteristic of medical 
practice. 20
 R M Veatch, "Models for 
Decision-making is unavoidably shared because each participant ^ * 1
 ( ^ ^ 2
 to¿5luSS 
brings to the therapeutic relationship their own beliefs, values, Rep0rt 5. 
perspectives and knowledge in a way that defines the very particular " D W Brock, "Shared Decision-
nature of that interaction. Shared decision-making implies a complex making" (1991) 1 Kennedy institute 
recursive relationship that may involve counselling, education, ^ R ^ h e S c k 8 ' "Reasonable Men 
significant personal interaction or clinical disagreement. It is a deeply
 and sick Human Beings„ (1986) 80 
contextual process responsive to the desires, needs, wishes and American Medicine 47'. 
capacities of the patient.23 For example, one patient may request » ibid. 
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extremely detailed information about alternative therapies or prefer to κ E R RID G E and 
maintain a "distance" from their physician, making decisions in M I T C H E L L 
isolation, whereas another may autonomously authorise their 
physician to make decisions about medical treatment for them. 
Indeed, it is not infrequently the case that sick but not incompetent 
patients wish to put their treatment in the hands of physicians they can 
trust. Ethical clinical practice demands much more of the physician 
than a superficial recognition of patient self-determination. What is 
needed is a recognition that a professional commitment to the 
patient's health and well-being (and the underlying principles of 
beneficence and non-maleficence) may determine the manner and 
extent to which the physician should respond to and serve the patient's 
wishes and desires. This does not suggest that the process of shared 
decision-making undermines patient autonomy; rather it simply 
recognises first, that there exists a number of ethical principles 
underlying therapeutics (that is, autonomy, beneficence, 
non-maleficence, justice) and that these may occasionally come into 
conflict,24 and secondly, that physicians, as moral agents, act in part 
as advocates for their patients' health, this role being framed in 
reference to the competent patient's autonomy or self-determination. 
Conclusion 
By shifting the focus of consent from the doctor or hypothetical 
"reasonable patient" to the individual patient, the Rogers ν Whitaker 
decision goes some way toward the ethical ideal. However, by 
maintaining an emphasis on the requirements for disclosure rather 
than understanding, communication skills and the interpersonal 
relationship that exists between health care professionals and patients, 
Rogers ν Whitaker ultimately fails to address the central core of 
ethical decision-making in clinical practice. Although consent is in its 
simplest sense an action, an authorisation of a medical intervention, 
in a much deeper, more pervasive sense it is an integral and continuing 
part of the daily process of shared and informed decision-making 
embedded in the clinical context. When seen in this light, the 
important thing may be not so much the elucidation of legal standards 
of disclosure, or patient self-determination and the development of 
institutional guidelines for consent, but better teaching of u Beauchamp and Childress, op cit 
interactional and communication skills to health care professionals, η 13. 
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